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Relations between the European Union and Russia are showing clear 
signs of strain. A new partnership agreement has not materialized, and 
the recent parliamentary elections led to a great deal of criticism. Despite 
all this, the EU Reform Treaty and the new Polish government provide a 
glimmer of hope. The Slovenian EU Presidency must now smooth the way 
for the new partnership agreement. 
 
I 
Stalemate 
Since the end of 2006 there have been few 
signs of progress in the relations between 
the European Union and Russia. Neither 
the Finnish, the German, nor the Portu-
guese presidencies were able to reach an 
internal EU consensus concerning the 
start of official negotiations with Moscow 
on a new treaty designed to replace the 
1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment (PCA, in force since 1997), which 
expired on 1 November 2007. 
 
It is true that the PCA is automatically re-
newed annually as long as neither of the 
parties gives notice that it intends to 
withdraw. However, the failure to enter 
into negotiations is a symbol of the crisis 
that currently dogs relations between the 
EU and Russia. The real reasons for this 
crisis run much deeper and are far more 
multidimensional than one might be led to 
suspect on the basis of the stalemate that 
now exists. Differing mutual perceptions 
seem to be of particular importance in this 
connection. To this day the majority of EU 
states believe that Russia is rather prob-
lematical. On the other hand, after seven 
years under Putin Russia once again 
thinks that it is a world power and wishes 
to be treated as such. 
 
The immediate cause for deferring the 
start of the negotiations was the veto is-
  
sued by the Polish government in Novem-
ber 2006, which was motivated by the 
Russian ban on imported Polish meat 
products in the autumn of 2005. In the 
meantime both the Kremlin and the new 
Polish government have made conciliatory 
gestures with regard to this issue. How-
ever, other EU member states now wish to 
make a link between the start of negotia-
tions with Moscow and the resolution of 
their own disputes with Russia.  
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between individual EU member states and 
 
The crisis in Russo-Estonian relations, 
which came to a head in April and May 
2007, and the growing dissatisfaction 
within the EU about its relations with Rus-
sia resulted in an EU demonstration of 
solidarity with its member states in May 
2007 that was addressed to the Russian 
government. This in turn made it impossi-
ble to make any progress with regard to 
the unresolved issues in EU-Russian rela-
tions in the course of the regular semi-
annual summit meeting in Samara (Rus-
sian Federation) in May 2007. 
 
Although the various contentious issues 
Russia may well be of importance for these 
countries and the EU as a whole, they 
cannot explain the current stalemate in 
EU-Russian relations, nor are they the only 
reason for it. At present there is, espe-
cially within the EU, no consensus about 
what exactly EU-Russian relations are ac-
tually trying to achieve. A number of 
states are opposed to a “policy of partner-
ship” with Russia and are calling for it to 
b e  r e v i s e d .  T h e y  h a v e  c a s t  d o u b t  o n  t h e  
strategic partnership with Moscow and 
would prefer more support and solidarity 
from the European Union, and less entan-
glement with and comprehensive in-
volvement in Russia. 
 
The strategic partnership is now being 
he stalemate is to a large extent Russia’s 
he net result of what has happened over 
called into question not only by member 
states which have a difficult relationship 
with Russia. The debate is being con-
ducted throughout the EU, and the critics 
are becoming more vociferous in virtually 
all of the member states. The Duma elec-
tion campaign, the influence exercised by 
government institutions, and the suppres-
sion of dissenting views by the state me-
dia have all contributed to the mood of 
scepticism about Russia. 
 
T
fault. After it became clear that Moscow 
would not be able to achieve its goal of 
concluding the new treaty with the EU 
during Putin’s second term, it showed lit-
tle willingness to strike a compromise 
with its opponents. It withdrew from the 
negotiations and concentrated on the bi-
lateral relationships with “trusted part-
ners” such as Germany, Italy or France 
who were favourably disposed towards 
Russia. 
 
T
the last twelve months is disappointing. 
Apart from some minor tactical progress 
made in the dialogue about the develop-
ment of the four Common Spaces, there 
h a s  b e e n  l i t t l e  m o v e m e n t  w i t h  r e g a r d  t o  
the issues which remain unresolved. This 
is true among other things of Russia’s de-
ferment of the finalization  of an agree- 
ment concluded in 2006 which grants 
European airlines overflight rights in Rus-
sian airspace. This is also true of the lack 
of progress being made in the resolution of 
the last remaining issues which stand in 
the way of Russia’s membership of the 
WTO. However, this is particularly true of 
the failure to formalize cooperation be-
tween the EU and Russia in the area of en-
ergy policy, the failure to regulate foreign 
investment, and the failure to define coop-
eration between the EU and Russia when it 
comes to dealing with international crises 
and conflicts, and especially the Kosovo 
issue. 
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utual irritations and friction are on the  M
increase, and the stalemate in relations 
not only persists, but is actually worsen-
ing. However, none of the parties will 
benefit from even more deadlock. In the 
crisis-laden EU-Russia relationship it is 
clearly time for a fresh start, and for this 
reason its outlines need to be redefined. 
 
II 
Outlines of a new EU    
The first  s 
he accumulation of controversial issues 
he European Union and Russia need to 
policy towards Russia 
priority for the EU member states i
to define their  common interests and reach a 
consensus on what the continuance and 
enhancement of the partnership(s) with 
Russia ought to look like. This is a task which 
devolves on the forthcoming EU presidency.  
 
T
which have arisen in EU-Russia relations 
does not in itself constitute a good reason 
for eschewing negotiations of any kind. A 
controversy ought in fact to be discussed 
in the course of such negotiations, and a 
solution should find expression in some 
kind of agreement. Thus what is also at is-
sue is the introduction of mechanisms for 
resolving and dealing with future disputes.  
 
T
reach agreement about where and how 
they will join forces to deal with the tasks 
with which they are confronted  The obvi-
ous challenges in their mutual relationship 
have been highlighted in the recent con-
troversies. 
The European Union and Russia need to 
redefine partnership and cooperation in 
the vitally important area of energy policy 
and conclude an appropriate agreement. It 
is not particularly meaningful to reduce 
this area to the simplistic question of 
whether Europe can and should sustain 
varying degrees of dependence on energy 
supplies. In an objective analysis the 
question does not arise. On the one hand 
the forecasts suggest that the proportion 
of Russian energy resources in the Euro-
pean market will not become significantly 
larger even if gas supplies as a whole were 
to increase, whereas the opposite is true of 
other non-EU states.  
 
Energy cooperation with Russia is only a 
he first priority for the EU member states 
ing EU presidency. 
part of the solution as far as the Europeans 
are concerned. At the same time the Euro-
pean Union and Russia will need each 
other in terms of energy policy in the long 
term, and this dependence will continue to 
be mutual. New agreements in this area 
are not merely desirable, but an absolute 
necessity. 
 
T
is to define their  common interests and 
reach a consensus on what the continu-
ance and enhancement of the partner-
ship(s) with Russia ought to look like. This 
is a task which devolves on the forthcom- 
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in EU-Russia relations 
 
each agreement about where and how 
an Union and Russia need to 
edefine partnership and cooperation in 
European Union and Russia must 
gree on mutually acceptable and recipro-
ich act in a trans-
arent manner should not have fewer in-
tnership in 
For M por-
tance. Russia’s economic successes over 
The accumulation of controversial issues 
which have arisen 
does not in itself constitute a good reason 
for eschewing negotiations of any kind. A 
controversy ought in fact to be discussed 
in the course of such negotiations, and a 
sue is the introduction of mechanisms for 
resolving and dealing with future disputes. 
 
The European Union and Russia need to 
solution should find expression in some 
kind of agreement. Thus what is also at is-
r
they will join forces to deal with the tasks 
with which they are confronted  The obvi-
ous challenges in their mutual relationship 
have been highlighted in the recent con-
troversies. 
 
The Europe
r
the vitally important area of energy policy 
and conclude an appropriate agreement. It 
is not particularly meaningful to reduce 
this area to the simplistic question of 
whether Europe can and should sustain 
varying degrees of dependence on energy 
supplies. In an objective analysis the ques-
tion does not arise. On the one hand the 
forecasts suggest that the proportion of 
Russian energy resources in the European 
market will not become significantly lar-
ger even if gas supplies as a whole were to 
increase, whereas the opposite is true of 
other non-EU states. Energy cooperation 
with Russia is only a part of the solution 
as far as the Europeans are concerned. At 
the same time the European Union and 
Russia will need each other in terms of 
energy policy in the long term, and this 
dependence will continue to be mutual. 
New agreements in this area are not 
merely desirable, but an absolute neces-
sity. 
 
The 
a
cal rules governing the registration and 
liberalization of mutual investments and 
the protection of investors’ rights. The 
current intransigent policy towards for-
eign investments in both Russia and the 
EU is detrimental to economic develop-
ment and cooperation. 
 
Russian companies wh
p
vestment rights and opportunities in the 
European Union than European companies 
in Russia. Here the principles of recipro-
city and legality are of vital importance. In 
this area in particular the need for EU-
wide regulations (as opposed to isolated 
national measures) is most clearly appa-
rent. The European business community is 
in favour of greater cooperation and thus 
has lobbied both the national governments 
and the EU Commission. 
“Redefining par
the energy sector.” 
oscow this is of paramount im
the past decade were not achieved entirely 
unaided. In fact they would have been un-
thinkable without Western investment, the 
transfer of specific skills, and without the 
massive loans provided by the West in 
general and Europe in particular. On 1 July 
2007 Russia’s foreign debt (now largely of 
a private nature) reached US$ 385 billion 
and is on a par with the accumulated re-
serves of the Russian state (US$ 406 bil-
lion on 1 July 2007). Russia continues to  
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ropean Union and Russia must not 
ermit their real and potential differences 
deepen and en-
summits between Russi
Presidency furnishes the 
 EU’s Central Asia  
The growin tic short-
comings in recent years  
be a structurally weak country and will 
continue to be dependent for a long time 
to come on European capital and expertise. 
 
The EU and Russia should reach agree-
ment on joint principles and procedures 
for international crisis management. Nei-
ther the EU nor Russia (nor, for that mat-
ter, the U.S.) possesses sufficient re-
sources to resolve the problems of regional 
and international security unaided. How-
ever, it is precisely in this area that the 
talks designed to generate content for the 
four Common Spaces have made little or 
no progress. In this context the Kosovo is-
sue is of especial significance for the EU. 
It constitutes a special challenge in the 
wake of the U.S. withdrawal from the Bal-
kans. 
 
The Eu
p
in what is their common neighbourhood – 
eastern Europe and the southern Caucasus 
region – to have an adverse effect on their 
relationship as a whole. In this context the 
EU’s Central Asia policy, which was devel-
oped during the German EU Presidency, is 
of especial importance. The aim should be 
to work for a greater degree of coordina-
tion and cooperation between the EU and 
Russia both in their common neighbour-
hood and in Central Asia. 
The European Union and Russia should not 
miss this opportunity to 
hance their partnership. That such an op-
portunity exists may be due to the fact 
that over the 
last eight years 
Russia has cer-
tainly been both 
ready and will-
ing to construe 
and accept the 
EU as part of a 
distinct and in-
creasingly im-
portant partner-
ship, though at 
the same time it 
has also made 
the point that it 
wishes to be 
treated as an 
equal partner. 
An analysis of 
the most recent 
a and the EU 
best example of 
this. Whereas economic policy topics still 
tended to be predominant at the end of the 
1990s, the agenda now includes those as-
pects of cooperation which relate to secu-
rity policy. The implementation of the EU 
Reform Treaty is bound to reinforce this 
tendency. 
“The
policy is of especial  
importance.” 
g criticism of democra
 and the differing
perceptions of developments in the area of 
security policy (for example, with regard 
to the expansion of NATO in eastern 
Europe, European arms control, or the 
resolution of the Kosovo issue) are not in 
themselves good arguments against a 
more profound partnership with Russia. 
However, they help us to see its limita-
tions in a sober light. A partnership should 
under no circumstances deny or gloss over 
the differences between Russia and the 
EU.  
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 to understand the difference between 
is divi-
ing line, it cannot be forced to do so by 
Decision-makers in the EU and in Russia 
need
the kind of multilateralism that is based 
on common values and on mutual under-
standing and coordination, and a partner-
ship which merely seeks to balance com-
peting interests and is concerned to em-
phasize the notion of sovereignty. 
 
If Russia does not wish to cross th
d
the EU. At the same time there should 
never be a categorical rejection of any 
kind of partnership with Moscow in the 
areas which are of crucial importance for 
both sides. 
 
III 
Embarking on a fresh start 
more favourable preco
 Treaty has made 
 possible to proceed with the much-
Recent developments have created a set of 
nditions, and this 
will make it possible to overcome the 
stalemate. The following three events were 
especially noteworthy: 
 
First, the Lisbon Reform
it
needed adjustment and transformation of 
EU institutions. The result will be a Union 
that is more easily capable of taking action 
on the basis of a more coherent Common 
Foreign and Security Policy. The signifi-
cance of the Reform Treaty for the rela-
tionship between the EU and Russia 
should be neither exaggerated nor belit-
tled. The new treaty does not absolve the 
Union from the need to reach agreement 
on a policy that is based on consensus and 
points in the direction of the future. The 
Treaty of Lisbon may well give an added 
impetus to the formation of consensus 
within the EU. 
 
Second, the Russian parliamentary elec-
ons saw the expected landslide victory 
 advent of a new government in 
oland in November 2007 will help EU-
ti
for the government party, “United Russia”. 
However, the new balance of power in 
Moscow will only become apparent after 
the Presidential elections in March. The 
Russian leadership will then be able to re-
turn to more mundane political matters 
and may become more receptive to the 
kinds of compromise solution that are 
needed to defend Russian interests. The 
reordering of the relationship between the 
European Union and Russia will once 
again be on the agenda of Russian policy-
makers. 
 
Third, the
P
Russian relations to get off to a fresh start. 
After all, the veto issued by the Kaczynski 
government, which prevented the start of 
official negotiations with Russia, was the 
symbolic starting-point of the crisis. The 
new government in Warsaw has now set 
its sights on improving Russian-Polish re-
lations as well as Russian-European rela-
tions. Moscow and Warsaw have shown 
that they are both in favour of a rap-
prochement. This development, which is 
certainly a positive one, can help to re-
move the formal obstacles standing in the 
way of discussions about the future shape 
of EU-Russian relations. 
 
 
IV 
Incipient Steps 
Whilst it  t of offi-
cial negotia ropean 
ctoral time-
ble, the regular semi-annual EU-Russia 
is true that the defermen
tions between the Eu
Union and Russia on a new treaty was not 
the reason for the current stalemate, it 
certainly acquired a symbolic character. 
For this reason the start of the negotia-
tions has assumed a special significance in 
the attempts to surmount the recent crisis. 
Russia, the EU and its member states 
should grasp the opportunity proffered by 
the preconditions which favour the con-
tinuation of their dialogue. In 2008 the in-
cipient step must be to initiate official ne-
gotiations about a new treaty. 
 
As a result of the Russian ele
ta
summit meeting, which usually takes 
place in the spring, has been moved to 
June 2008. The meeting will be of especial  
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importance in the resolution of the current 
crisis, even though the official negotia-
tions between the EU and Russia can only 
begin in the second half of the year under 
the French Presidency. 
 
Thus in the first half of 2
E
cult task of reaching a consensus within 
the EU about future policy towards Russia. 
And, last but least, it will also have to pre-
pare for the negotiations themselves. In 
this respect the small EU state can draw 
on a wealth of experience, since a number 
of years ago, during a period fraught with 
difficulties, it organized encounters be-
tween the Russian and American presi-
dents. 
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